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Abstract 
 The purpose of this research was to demonstrate a methodology using an Epoch-
Era Analysis to quantify and estimate the value of design flexibility early in the 
Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition life cycle.  This method was implemented 
using a possible replacement to the Air Force’s fighter-trainer aircraft as a baseline and a 
set of future requirements that would change the baseline.  An existing Cost Estimating 
Relationship tool was utilized in conjunction with a decision tree modeling approach to 
accommodate uncertain future needs.  Sensitivity analysis was performed to identify 
model parameters with dominant effects on the recommended design strategies.  The 
results indicated that this methodology can quantitatively measure design flexibility using 
existing tools when key assumptions are made.  The methodology exists as a proof of 
concept within the domain of aircraft to quantitatively measure design flexibility early in 
the acquisition life cycle.  Further research is required to characterize the assumptions of 
this study and to test this methodology in other domains to validate its broader 
applicability.  
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EXPLORING A METHOD TO QUANTITATIVELY MEASURE DESIGN 
FLEXIBILITY EARLY IN THE DEFENSE ACQUISITION LIFE CYCLE 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
General Issue 
In the world of DOD acquisition, flexibility is often touted as a valuable “ility.”  
However, effectively designing flexibility into systems and objectively measuring the 
outcome is exceedingly difficult.  The added costs of designing flexibility early in the 
acquisition life cycle, as well as the future costs incurred, can be difficult to justify 
without a means of valuing said flexibility.   
A developing example is the replacement aircraft for the Northrop T-38C Talon.  
It is the current airframe used for the fighter/bomber track of the United States Air 
Force’s Specialized Undergraduate Pilot Training (SUPT).  First introduced in 1961, the 
T-38 received a host of upgrades over its life cycle to maintain the trainer’s relevance to 
newer generations of fighters and bombers culminating in the latest version, the T-38C 
[United States Air Force 2014].  While the T-38C has undergone a service life extension 
program, the Flight Training System Program Office located at Wright-Patterson Air 
Force Base projects the T-38C airframe will reach the end of its useful life in 2020 
[United States Air Force 2014]. 
The McDonnell Douglas T-45 Goshawk is the current airframe used by the Navy 
as its aircraft carrier-capable jet trainer.  First introduced in 1988, the T-45 received a 
glass cockpit upgrade and other modernizations for continued use as a contemporary jet 
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trainer [United States Navy 2009].  Similar to the T-38C, the T-45 will likely see 
continued use as the Navy’s jet trainer through continuous modernization efforts. 
With the expiration of the T -38C airframe approaching in 2020 and the time-
consuming nature of large acquisitions programs, the T-X FoS (Family of Systems), 
Advanced Pilot Trainer (APT) acquisitions process began in the fall of 2003 [United 
States Air Force 2014].  The T-45 Goshawk will also reach the end of its useful life, 
perhaps ten to fifteen years after the T-38C.  If there were a method to quantitatively 
capture the value of designing flexibility into the T-38C replacement to accommodate the 
Navy’s T-45 replacement, decision-makers could be better informed on whether or not 
the additional resources to design flexibility into the T-38C replacement would yield an 
acceptable return on investment.  Similarly, additional future requirements could impact 
and possibly be accommodated by designing flexibility into the T-38C replacement 
trainer. 
Problem Statement 
Given the DOD’s budget-constrained environment, there is further pressure to 
investigate methods to reduce life cycle cost.  The Analysis of Alternatives completed by 
the T-X FoS ATP program offered a range of materiel solutions differing in the 
performance capabilities of the airframe being acquired relevant to the Air Force’s jet 
trainer requirements.  Rather than focus solely on the Air Force’s fighter/bomber 
requirements, the concept of design flexibility and its quantitative measure was explored 
in order to accommodate other user’s requirements.  For this study, three additional 
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requirements were considered: Navy trainers, Special Operations trainers, and Heavy 
airframe trainers. 
Research Objectives/Questions/Hypotheses 
The objective of this research was to demonstrate a method that models the life 
cycle cost (LCC) impacts associated with engineering design flexibility into a system 
early in the acquisition process.  The T-X program served as a demonstration of this 
method which attempted to characterize the cost of adding flexibility to the baseline 
design and its impact (or lack thereof) on the LCC of the modified system. 
Research Focus 
There are a multitude of factors that can affect the LCC of an airframe.  The scope 
of this research focused on how design changes driven by uncertain requirements in the 
early phases of acquisitions affected the LCC of the proposed airframes.  LCC includes 
the following costs: research and development, investment, operating and support, and 
disposal [Defense Acquisition University 2013].  In this research, the calculation of life 
cycle costs were built into the cost estimating relationship (CER) tool provided by the Air 
Force Life Cycle Management Center (AFLCMC/XZE) and divided into development, 
production, operations and support (O&S), and disposal costs. 
Investigative Questions 
1. How can design flexibility, as a proxy measure for design flexibility, be 
quantifiably measured in the early stages of development of a system? 
 
2. Can we measure the impact to expected LCC stemming from design changes 
to accommodate flexibility given uncertain future requirements? 
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3. Can a general method to quantify the value of design flexibility be developed 
and applied to other domains beyond airframes? 
Methodology 
A literature review examining the existing work on how to define flexibility and 
methods to measure flexibility was conducted.  Based upon the information found, a 
definition and metric for design flexibility was established and utilized for this study. 
An Epoch-Era Analysis approach was used to define discrete manifestations of 
the proposed system and evaluate the differences in LCC [Ross 2006].  By utilizing 
existing cost estimation relationship models developed by AFLCMC/XZE, separate 
epochs were created and examined to study the effects of design flexibility on the LCC of 
a proposed replacement to the T-38C trainer aircraft. 
The baseline system was one of many proposed replacements to the T-38C trainer 
aircraft that met Air Force trainer requirements.  Epochs were added to the baseline 
system by including three additional uncertain future requirements: Navy, Special 
Operations, and Heavy.  Specific design changes to the baseline Air Force trainer 
requirements were considered to capture the requirements of the uncertain future 
requirements.  Based on notional probabilities of occurrence, the expected LCCs of each 
epoch/era were compared to determine how the differing epoch variables impacted each 
era.  
The cost of design flexibility was compared to the cost of building separate 
discrete system that met the possible requirements of the Navy, Special Operations, and 
Heavy airframes.  A comparison between designing for flexibility and developing 
separate discrete system shed light onto the value of early design for flexibility. 
5 
The current SUPT syllabus, the Initial Capabilities Document of the T-X 
program, and subject matter experts were utilized to create a rough baseline of Air Force 
requirements.  The cost estimates developed for this research do not represent actual 
program estimates in order to allow the open distribution of the results.  Separate baseline 
epochs adding requirements were created to examine the impact that design flexibility 
had on LCC.  The additional capability required by each epoch variable is notional and 
the assumptions made are discussed in their appropriate sections. 
The separate epochs are associated with variables that assumed a range of values 
that distinguished one from another.  The ranges of values were captured in the CER tool 
and the outputs were recorded.  This data served as inputs into a decision tree that 
calculated expected LCC for a wide variety of possible outcomes.  For further insight, 
sensitivity analyses were conducted on several inputs to determine their impacts on the 
tradespace of expected LCC. 
Assumptions/Limitations 
Because the purpose of this study was to demonstrate a method, actual values for 
variable inputs and model outputs were not necessarily accurate compared to real-world 
values.  Rather, they attempted to capture a range of reasonable values and suggest trends 
associated with design flexibility. 
The cost model used in this study was limited by the manner of its inputs.  This 
study worked around these input limitations which were noted in their appropriate 
sections.  Other assumptions were noted as necessary in this research paper. 
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Implications 
This exploratory model to quantify design flexibility was first created in the 
context of the T-X program.  However, the model should be broad enough to 
accommodate other domains.  With a general method to help quantify design flexibility, 
decision-makers at all levels could benefit from increased insight into adding, removing, 
or avoiding additional requirements.  In the long run, the intent is to reduce total costs 
associated with acquiring new systems and modifying existing systems by providing a 
better understanding of the returns on investment inherent in design flexibility. 
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II. Literature Review 
Chapter Overview 
The purpose of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework, define key 
terms, and identify studies and models that supported the modeling of design flexibility. 
Literature 
Multi-Attribute Tradespace Exploration with Concurrent Design (MATE-CON) 
MATE-CON is a powerful tool to evaluate multiple architectures and their 
respective designs [Ross 2003].  For longer studies, the design-level analysis can be used 
to re-evaluate the architecture-level analysis to further improve the accuracy of the 
models used and the architectures selected. 
MATE-CON can be broken down into five phases: need identification, 
architecture solution exploration, architecture evaluation, design solution exploration, and 
design evaluation.  Developed and used extensively by Dr. Adam Ross at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), he describes the process as such: 
 
“The Need Identification phase motivates the entire project, providing the needs, 
mission, and scope for the project.  MATE-CON is the marriage of the 
architecture-level exploration and evaluation (MATE) with the design-level 
exploration and evaluation (CON).  Architecture-level exploration and evaluation 
is accomplished using models and simulations to transform a large set of design 
vectors to attributes and then evaluating each set of attributes in utility-cost space.  
The set of modeled design vectors, or architectures, are analyzed in utility-cost 
space and the best architectures are selected for the design-level exploration and 
evaluation” [Ross 2003, 70]. 
 
8 
 With MATE-CON, Ross introduced a straightforward and powerful tool to 
examine a large set of designs and their impact to the value on the system known as an 
Epoch and Era Analysis (EEA).   
Epoch-Era Analysis 
 EEA is an approach developed alongside MATE-CON that models several 
proposed designs and compares cost and utility metrics.  EEA was originally created to 
be used with MATE; the original implementation modeled a vast number of space system 
designs and measures their respective cost and utilities [Ross, et al. 2004].   
An Epoch “is a time period that bounds the change scenario during which utility 
functions, constraints, design concepts, available technologies, and articulated attributes 
are defined” [Ross 2006, 170].  Similar to economics analysis, EEA seeks to break down 
a complex problem into a series of simple problems.  For both short and long run 
analyses, many system attributes and constraints are “fixed in the short run (Epoch), but 
variable in the long run (Era)” [Ross 2006, 170-171]. 
 Each epoch has an identified beginning state and ending state.  Each epoch has 
key variables that impact the defined value of the system that differentiates it from other 
epochs [Fitzgerald, Ross and Rhodes 2011].  A meaningful epoch variable also captures 
the uncertainty associated with the respective epoch.  When multiple epochs are ordered 
together, an era that highlights a potential progression of system states over a period of 
time is created [Ross 2006].  The era allows an analyst to measure how changing epoch 
variables affect the system over a period of time based upon a metric of the analyst’s 
choosing. 
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Defining and Measuring Flexibility 
 It is important to distinguish two types of flexibility, process and design: 
“The literature on flexibility in engineering design addresses two distinct problems: 
the first one focuses on the flexibility of the design process, and the second one on 
the flexibility of the design itself (not the process through which a product or a 
system is designed). This distinction between the flexibility of the process and 
flexibility of the design is not often made in the literature, and it sometimes adds to 
the confusion” [Saleh, Mark, and Jordan 2009, 313]. 
 
According to the distinction between the two types of flexibility, this research 
focused on a method to model design flexibility. Within the academic community, there 
are some inconsistencies that exist in the definition of design flexibility.  A literature 
survey was conducted by Ryan examining 21 varying definitions of design flexibility 
spanning 1997-2010.  The differences among the definitions included: does the system 
actually change, does the change happen quickly or cost-effectively, is the change 
foreseeable, does the change occur before or after fielding [Ryan, Jacques and Colombi 
2013].  Many of these definitions attempt to capture value but this is accomplished in 
slightly different ways. 
Adaptability is defined as the ability of a system that can modify its capabilities 
without external intervention [Ryan, Jacques and Colombi 2013].  Machine learning is a 
prime example of adaptability where an adaptable system can improve on its existing 
capabilities without the need for additional programming.  Commonality seeks to create 
value by reducing unique parts requirements and establishing economies of scale with 
producing and maintaining shared parts [Simpson and D'Souza 2008].  With 
commonality, the certainty of additional requirements is implied with the effort to 
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standardize parts between multiple systems.  The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter is an example 
where commonality was implemented as a cost reduction measure. 
Of particular interest is design flexibility, which is defined as a system designed 
with certain characteristics that may not optimize the immediate set of requirements, but 
easily allows the system to accommodate, via modifications, new requirements after the 
system has been fielded [Saleh, Mark, and Jordan 2009].  Design flexibility is also 
described as “the measure of how easily a system’s capabilities can be modified in 
response to external change” [Ryan, Jacques and Colombi 2013].  In this definition, 
“easily” refers to the cost effectiveness and timely manner of the modification to the 
system.  
In the literature, the definitions of design flexibility and design robustness are 
similar and often confused with one another, but are distinctly different.  Design 
flexibility “implies an ability to satisfy changing requirements by changing the system 
after the system has been fielded” and “an ability of the design to be changed in order to 
track requirements changes” [Saleh, Mark, and Jordan 2009, 316].    Saleh used a 
spacecraft example to demonstrate his definition of design flexibility.  He states that the 
spacecraft may require new functionalities as events and/or new data become available.  
The changing functionality is also quite likely due to the design lifetime of most 
spacecraft, which demands that the spacecraft incorporate design flexibility to 
accommodate these future changes [Saleh, Mark, and Jordan 2009].  This differs from 
design robustness which captures the ability of a design to “satisfy a fixed set of 
requirements, despite changes in the environment or within the system” [Saleh, Mark, 
and Jordan 2009, 316]. 
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After defining flexibility, the next challenge is how to measure flexibility.  
Currently, the DOD’s LCC includes research and development, investment, operating 
and support, and disposal costs over a system’s life cycle [Defense Acquisition 
University 2013].  In addition to these costs, LCC estimates take into consideration 
potential program risks [Defense Acquisition University 2013].  Although 
comprehensive, DOD LCC estimates are ultimately a static measure assuming the 
program will not deviate from the acquisition program baseline [Defense Acquisition 
University 2013].  The DOD’s method of estimating LCC does not attempt to measure 
flexibility in any way.   
Ryan proposed a methodology that measured a cost coined as Current Expected 
Value Life Cycle Cost Curve (CEVLCCC) [E. Ryan, et al. 2013].  This methodology 
sought to capture cost impacts due to potential changes to the baseline.  Of interest, this 
methodology accommodated the ability for the baseline system to respond to potential 
changes.  If a system could respond cost-effectively to a change to its baseline it would 
drive down the associated cost penalty applied to that system in order to achieve design 
flexibility [E. Ryan, et al. 2013].  Ryan’s methodology required that each system design 
candidate be of sufficient maturity that traditional life cycle cost estimates could be 
implemented.  Unfortunately, this is not the case for this study.  However, Ryan’s 
approach to identify CEVLCCC as one proxy metric to capture value was used in a 
similar manner for this study. 
Cost Estimating Tool 
Engineers at AFLCMC/XZE have developed an Excel-based airframe LCC 
estimating tool that takes user inputs depending on the function and design features of the 
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hypothetical aircraft and outputs LCC as a function of development, production, O&S, 
and disposal costs.  Calculations are taken from past data with input from subject matter 
experts. 
 An example of one input is the type of aircraft being developed.  The options 
within the tool allow for fighter, bomber, cargo, and trainer aircraft.  Based upon this 
selection, the tool draws upon information from past airframes of that type to estimate 
several costs which include, but are not limited to: annual operation costs, maintenance 
costs, and development costs. 
 Although a powerful tool, the estimating tool has limitations as well.  Unless a 
specific component is coded into the tool, the only method to account for an additional 
feature is to incorporate it into an existing input.  For example, if a user wanted another 
estimate of an airframe with a larger landing gear, no explicit input for landing gear type 
exists.  The way around this limitation is to adjust the total empty aircraft weight to 
accommodate a reasonable value for the modification.  Typically, only major components 
such as engines and avionics have dedicated input values [AFLCMC/XZE 2013].  
Conclusion 
 There are many models and techniques that improve the analysis of multiple 
alternatives, define flexibility, measure flexibility, and compare flexibility.  This research 
intends to take these models and incorporate them into a unified method that better 
predicts and analyzes the cost associated with design flexibility using the T-X program as 
a source of data.  Although based off data from the T-X program, the steps to implement 
this method should be applicable to other disciplines as well. 
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III. Methodology 
Chapter Overview  
The purpose of this chapter was to describe the research methodology of this 
study, explain the sample selection, describe the procedures used in designing the 
instrument and collecting the data, and provide an explanation of the procedures used to 
analyze the data. 
Based on the literature review, design flexibility was measured based upon the 
ability for an airframe in development to accommodate future potential requirements.  
The metric used to measure design flexibility was the expected LCC, a proxy measure of 
design flexibility [Ryan, Jacques and Colombi 2013]. 
A quantitative and predictive research methodology was used for this study.  
Epochs and their associated variables were established based upon the four different 
aircraft requirements: Air Force, Navy, Special Operations, and Heavy (transport).  Next, 
the cost estimating relationship (CER) tool developed by AFLCMC/XZE was used to 
generate LCC estimates based on the different aircraft design requirements.  A separate 
LCC estimate was generated to compare the cost of an Air Force system with additional 
requirements incorporated versus the cost of a new dedicated system.  To examine impact 
the additional requirement had on the system, Ross’ epoch and era analysis was used to 
observe the differences and trends across all the eras.  In addition to the existing tools, 
general assumptions towards the requirements of different users were made to model the 
different aircraft configurations based on the intended user.  Multiple sensitivity analyses 
14 
were conducted to examine the impact of uncertain parameters on the output of the 
method. 
Although modeling past behavior and trends is important for a decision-maker, 
future behavior of a system is more important than explaining past observations [Shmueli 
2007].  Ultimately, the method developed in this study should be of use to decision-
makers attempting to quantify the cost associated with designing flexibility into their 
systems regardless of the cost models used. 
Sample 
Reiterating the previous point on Ross’ MATE-CON, the process can be broken 
down into five phases: need identification, architecture solution exploration, architecture 
evaluation, design solution exploration, and design evaluation [Ross 2003].  At the time 
of this study, the Air Force had already accomplished the need identification, architecture 
solution exploration, and architecture evaluation for the T-X program.  The need 
identification requirement was established first as the T-X FoS ATP’s Initial Capabilities 
Document and later as the Capability Development Document.  Both architecture 
solution exploration and evaluation were completed as identified by the “family of 
systems” approach to acquisitions [Ross, et al. 2004].  The Air Force expanded its 
acquisition focus beyond just the airframe and recognized the importance of capturing all 
aspects of a new trainer. 
This study continues with design solution exploration and design evaluation.  The 
design solution exploration considered the impact of adding three additional requirements 
to the replacement; a Navy, Special Operations, and Heavy (transport) requirements.  The 
design evaluation was the result of this study. 
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Testing 
 The first step in examining the impact of additional requirements to a T-X 
baseline design was to establish separate epochs.  The Air Force epoch costs reflected the 
baseline design while the additional epochs captured the cost to add additional 
requirements.  Ideally, the additional epochs would capture only their respective 
requirements rather than include the AF requirements.  But due to the limitation of the 
CER tool and the notional nature of the additional requirements, this was a necessary 
assumption.  The epoch variables represented the future possibility that the requirements 
and/or the design parameters demanded of the baseline system could change. 
 For this study, the epoch variables and their possible range of values represented 
realizations of requirements that were not originally identified in the Acquisition Program 
Baseline (APB).  However, the inclusion of the epoch variables was assumed to occur 
before production costs were incurred.  This point is further clarified in Chapter 4. 
 It is important to note that AFLCMC/XZE developed multiple baseline Air Force 
only requirement (AF) epochs for their own estimating purposes. This study utilized their 
estimate of a single-engine supersonic aircraft as the baseline AF estimate.  The different 
epoch variables were notional and chosen based on discussions with subject matter 
experts at AFLCMC/XZE as well as the modeling limitations of the CER tool.  This was 
deemed reasonable as the purpose of the model was to explore a new method to measure 
design flexibility and the accuracy of the epoch variables was deemed less important for 
this initial demonstration of the methodology.  Table 1: CER Tool Assumptions, 
summarizes the assumptions related to the CER tool that were made for this study.   
These assumptions were reiterated as appropriate in the latter sections.   
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Table 1: CER Tool Assumptions 
CER Tool Assumptions 
Disposal costs were omitted from LCC calculation 
Additional epoch requirements were added to the baseline AF estimate 
N and H epoch variables were converted to aircraft weight 
Timeline for development, production, and retirement remained constant 
Annual production of aircraft remained constant 
 
Separate epochs capturing Navy requirements (N), Special Operations 
requirements (SO), and Heavy requirements (H) were created based upon the identified 
epoch variables.  Ideally, unique requirements for each epoch would be used to capture 
their respective LCCs.  However, AF specific requirements were the only requirements 
available.  Therefore, the N, SO, and H requirements were additions to the AF baseline 
and assumed to fully encompass AF requirements.  Sensitivity analysis helped address 
the unrealistic assumption that N, SO, and H epochs fully encompassed AF requirements. 
In regard to the number-of-engines variable, rather than an addition to the AF 
baseline, the number of engines represented a potential change to the AF baseline and 
was implemented as such in this study.  In hindsight, a more appropriate approach could 
characterize the number of engines as a design decision rather than a stochastic event.  
Additional epochs and eras could be created to capture the decision to incorporate one or 
two engines.  To scope the possible number of eras to a reasonable total, the number of 
engines was treated as a stochastic event and the costs associated with a one-or-two 
engine design were averaged into the appropriate epoch costs.  A summary of the epochs 
and their variables are listed in Table 2: Epoch Summary. 
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Table 2: Epoch Summary 
Epoch Epoch Variables 
Air Force Requirement 
(AF) N/A 
Navy Requirement (N) 
Number of Engines 
Reinforced Landing Gear 
Tail Hook 
# of Combat-Coded A/C 
Special Operations (SO) Improved Avionics # of Combat-Coded A/C 
Heavy Requirements (H) 
Number of Engines 
Cockpit Interface Interchangeability 
# of Combat-Coded A/C 
 
 The N epoch variables are meant to represent features similar to the existing T-45 
Goshawk.  Two features included a tail hook and a stronger structure supporting the 
landing gears to accommodate carrier landings [United States Navy 2009].  The addition 
of these requirements was reflected in the CER tool as additional aircraft weight.  The 
option for one or two engines was also a potential requirement due to the Navy’s affinity 
for two engines as seen on their current F-18 and past F-14 fighter aircraft. This option 
was explicitly specified in the CER tool.  The purpose of the epoch variables and their 
combinations with a one or two engine design was to generate discrete LCC points in 
order to calculate the mean LCC of the epoch.  It was assumed the range of LCC across 
the range of epoch variables was a uniform distribution in the absence of specific 
distribution data.  This assumption was extended to the SO and H epochs as well.  The 
method could easily accommodate other LCC distributions such as triangle and normal. 
The SO epoch variable of improved avionics captured the clandestine nature of 
special operations.  This can be manifested as avionics that allow for low-level flying at 
night or a sophisticated communications/electronics package similar to those equipped in 
18 
the EC-130 that support special operations [United States Air Force 2005].  The avionics 
weight was an explicit input in the CER tool that was utilized to capture this SO 
requirement.   
The H epoch translated cockpit interface interchangeability into aircraft weight in 
the CER tool.  Without an explicit input in the CER tool to capture this epoch variable, 
aircraft weight was chosen as a proxy input that best represented the addition of cockpit 
interface interchangeability.  This epoch variable was meant to capture the ability for the 
AF aircraft to accommodate a different cockpit layout more appropriate for a heavy 
trainer aircraft vs a fighter-bomber trainer aircraft.  Notionally, this could include location 
of throttle, joystick type, joystick position, and instrument layout.  Like the N epoch, a 
one-or-two engine design was combined with each possible weight configuration to 
calculate the mean LCC of the H epoch.   
For the N, H, and SO epochs, the number of combat coded aircraft was another 
epoch variable they shared and was directly input into the CER tool.  This variable 
captured the uncertainty in fleet size representative of any aircraft acquisition.  Along 
with the other epoch specific variables, the number of combat-coded aircraft was input 
with every combination of aircraft weight, avionics weight, and number of engines as 
appropriate to create a range of LCCs and ultimately calculate the average LCC of the 
epoch. 
 
 
 
 
19 
Eight eras were evaluated in this study:  
1. AF = AF epoch only 
2. AFN = AF and N epochs 
3. AFSO = AF and SO epochs  
4. AFH = AF and H epochs 
5. AFNSO = AF, N, and SO epochs 
6. AFNH = AF, N, and H epochs 
7. AFSOH = AF, SO, and H epochs 
8. AFNSOH = AF, N, SO, and H epochs 
 
The eras evaluated in this study were not collectively exhaustive as a whole, but 
collectively exhaustive of the eras that included AF epochs.  Each era represented a 
possible future reality.  A design strategy represented the decision-maker’s choice to 
pursue or forgo design flexibility.  Among the possible design strategies involving the AF 
epoch, the AFNSO and AFSOH eras were omitted from the analysis.   
The design strategies evaluated in this study were: 
1. AF = AF epoch only 
2. AFN = AF and N epochs 
3. AFSO = AF and SO epochs  
4. AFH = AF and H epochs 
5. AFNH = AF, N, and H epochs 
6. AFNSOH = AF, N, SO, and H epochs 
 
The two omitted design strategies were not considered because the six design 
strategies selected were representative of multiple epoch eras.  The additional design 
strategies would not demonstrate any additional insight to the methodology than those 
chosen to be evaluated. 
Once a design strategy was selected, each of the eight eras became a possible 
realization.  Palisade’s Precision Tree add-in for Excel was used to visualize and 
calculate expected LCCs based upon probabilities of an era occurring.  Figure 1: Partial 
Decision Tree illustrates a portion of the decision tree used in this study.  The green 
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square represents a decision node for the possible choices that a decision-maker could 
make.  In this study, the decision node represents aircraft design strategies that could be 
pursued.  The design strategy is the decision-maker’s choice to design flexibility (or not) 
into the baseline AF epoch.  Red circles represent chance nodes with branches that 
capture a set of mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive outcomes.   
 
 
Figure 1: Partial Decision Tree 
 
 The probability associated with each era represent the probability that the era will 
be realized for a given design strategy.  Because the eight eras including an AF epoch are 
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mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive, the sum of the probabilities must equal 
100%.  It’s feasible that the probabilities among the possible eras could change 
depending on the design strategy chosen.  However, with no good method to capture how 
a chosen design strategy would impact the probabilities of its outcomes, it was assumed 
that the probabilities of each outcome across all design strategies were equal.  The 
probabilities of the eight eras are listed in Table 3: Era Summary.   
Table 3: Era Summary 
Era Epochs Probability of Occurring 
AF AF 10% 
AFN AF + N 30% 
AFSO AF + SO 15% 
AFH AF + H 15% 
AFNSO AF + N + SO 10% 
AFNH AF + N + H 9% 
AFSOH AF + SO + H 6% 
AFNSOH AF + N + SO + H 5% 
 
The probability of occurrence for each era was determined based upon the 
foreseeable need for a new trainer aircraft.  Due to the introduction of 5th generation 
fighter aircraft and improvements in avionics, modern day trainers must prepare pilots to 
become familiar with these improved capabilities.  The T-45 Navy trainer entered service 
in 1991 and primarily prepared Navy aviators for the F-18 Hornet [United States Navy 
2009].  With the introduction of the F-35 as the Air Force and Navy’s next fighter, it was 
deemed that the eras that captured Navy requirements had a higher probability of 
occurrence than the other comparable eras.  Given that the probability of one era 
occurring impacted the probabilities of the remaining eras, the probabilities were treated 
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as dependent.  Due to the dependent nature of the probabilities, there are conditional 
probabilities that are implied by the probability distribution among the possible eras. 
The trainer aircraft used to prepare SUPT pilots for many of the platforms that 
support special operations entered service in the 70’s [United States Navy 2012].  The 
aircraft used to train SUPT pilots for Heavy missions was adopted in 1992 but has not 
seen significant upgrades since its adoption [United States Air Force 2005].  Based upon 
the age of the trainer aircraft used to satisfy the Special Operations and Heavy 
requirements, these eras were assigned the next highest probability of occurrence.  The 
AF only era was considered the next probable era followed by AFNSOH due to the small 
chance that all additional requirements would be realized. 
The additional requirements of each epoch variable in this study, other than the 
number of combat-coded aircraft, were meant to be design changes to the existing Air 
Force baseline.  For example, the N epoch variable of a tail hook would be a flexible 
design addition to the Air Force baseline.  This design consideration would require some 
modification to the Air Force design to cost effectively accommodate a tail hook in the 
future if the need arose.  This design flexibility approach was used in contrast to simply 
adding the full design requirement of a tail hook to the AF baseline because there was no 
certainty that an era such as AFN would be realized.  Also, the additional requirements 
levied on the baseline AF system would have negative impacts on the cost and 
performance of the system.   
Designing flexibility into any system comes at a cost.  To calculate the impact to 
LCC of the additional requirements to the baseline design, a subjective impact value from 
0.0 – 1.0, was added to the production and operation and sustainment (O&S) cost of the 
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relevant era.  The subjective impact was a penalty that design flexibility imposed on the 
AF baseline that resulted in higher production and O&S costs.  In regards to development 
costs, the difference in additional development cost to accommodate flexible design was 
added to the AF development cost.  The nature of the epoch variables was consistent with 
Saleh’s definition of design flexibility that a system could be modified more easily if 
additional requirements were levied on the baseline system [Saleh, Mark, and Jordan 
2009]. 
The values of each epoch variable were limited by the CER tool.  Explicit design 
changes could not be directly added as inputs into the CER tool for N and H 
requirements.  These requirements were translated into aircraft weight, an input the CER 
tool could accommodate.  The breakdown of the epoch variables, their baseline values, 
and their possible values are listed in Table 4: Epoch Variables below. 
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Table 4: Epoch Variables 
Epoch Variables Baseline Value Possible Values 
Number of Engines 1 Engine 1 Engine 2 Engines 
Reinforced Landing 
Gear 
A/C Weight 
9900 lbs 
(+0 lbs) 
Additional A/C Weight 
200 lbs 
300 lbs 
400 lbs 
500 lbs 
600 lbs 
700 lbs 
800 lbs 
Tail Hook 
A/C Weight 
9900 lbs 
(+0 lbs) 
Additional A/C Weight 
400 lbs 
500 lbs 
… 
1300 lbs 
1400 lbs 
Avionics 
Avionics Weight 
360 lbs 
(+0 lbs) 
Additional Avionics Weight 
100 lbs 
200 lbs 
… 
600 lbs 
700 lbs 
Cockpit Interface 
Interchangeability 
A/C Weight 
9900 lbs 
(+0 lbs) 
Additional A/C Weight 
100 lbs 
200 lbs 
300 lbs 
400 lbs 
# of Combat Coded A/C 350 A/C 
# of A/C 
N: 200, 250, 300 
SO: 150, 200, 250 
H: 150, 200, 250, 300 
 
The range of values for each epoch variable was notionally selected.  Certain 
considerations were made to ensure that the maximum epoch variable values remained 
reasonable.  For example, the addition of a reinforced landing gear and tail hook should 
not increase total aircraft weight by 50%.  Similar considerations were taken to determine 
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the minimum values for each epoch variable.  Landing gear and tail hook considerations 
were deemed to have a larger impact to aircraft weight than the ability for the cockpit to 
accommodate separate configurations.  The values for the number of combat-coded 
aircraft were chosen based on the total number of trainer aircraft produced for each 
respective epoch.   
Each epoch must have a beginning and ending state identified.  Clearly, the 
beginning and ending state of the AF baseline was before LCC was incurred as only eras 
involving the AF epoch were considered.  Any additional epochs began after 
development costs were incurred but prior to production costs.  The decision to pursue a 
design strategy must be made prior to DOD acquisition Milestone A.  The described 
timeline is illustrated in Figure 2: Era Timeline Assumption using the AFN design 
strategy and AFN era occurrence as an example. 
 
 
Figure 2: Era Timeline Assumption 
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Once the AFN design strategy is chosen, AFN development costs are incurred 
regardless of N epoch occurring or not occurring.  The decision whether to exercise the N 
epoch must occur after development cost is incurred but before production cost is fully 
incurred.  For example, if the decision to not exercise N epoch was made before 
development costs were incurred, then no further investments to the AF baseline should 
be made and therefore, no additional costs to the AF baseline would be incurred.  Eras 
with three or more epochs would look similar to Figure 2: Era Timeline Assumption with 
the chosen design strategy occurring before Milestone A and the decision to exercise the 
additional epochs occurring between development and production costs. 
If the decision to exercise an epoch were to occur after production costs were 
incurred, another “penalty” factor would be required to account for the extra cost of 
restarting production or extending the production timeline beyond original estimates.  
This is illustrated in Figure 3 using AFN as an example. 
 
 
Figure 3: Possible Era Realization 
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Other penalties such as loss of expertise, additional staff support costs, lack of 
bulk orders are some of the additional costs that would be incurred.  This research 
assumed a timeline as shown in Figure 2: Era Timeline Assumption due to the inability of 
the CER tool to calculate the aforementioned penalty to LCC and avoid unnecessary 
speculation.   
Another necessary assumption was once a design strategy was chosen, there are 
no “off ramps” available. For example, after AFN’s development cost occurs and if the 
decision to not exercise N epoch’s requirements was made, there was no option that 
allowed the acquisition to revert back to a baseline AF design and produce AF aircraft, 
effectively avoiding any future cost penalties associated with design flexibility. 
The expected cost of flexibility was measured by comparing a given era’s 
expected LCC against the expected LCC of the era’s respective epochs.  The expected 
LCC of AFN was measured against the sum of the LCC of AF and N epochs to determine 
if there was cost savings associated with design flexibility.  All cost figures were 
calculated in Base Year 2013 (BY2013) dollars. 
Finally, one and two-way sensitivity analyses were conducted in order to analyze 
how changes in some of the major inputs would affect expected LCC.  Specifically, era 
LCC estimates, probability of occurrence, and subjective impact sensitivity analyses were 
conducted.  Due to the greater uncertainty associated with subjective inputs, a sensitivity 
analysis was deemed necessary to establish trends associated with those inputs.  The goal 
was to view the impact that the subjective inputs had on the output. 
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Summary 
 The goal of this study is to demonstrate a method to quantitatively measure the 
value of design flexibility.  Reasonable assumptions were made to overcome limited 
information, CER tool functionality, and to properly scope this research.  Other notional 
assumptions such as probability of occurrence and subjective impact were the subject of 
sensitivity analyses to identify the trending impact these inputs had on the method’s 
output. 
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IV. Analysis and Results 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter covers the implementation of the methodology and the associated 
outcomes.  The goal of this analysis was to demonstrate the method proposed in Chapter 
3 and to quantify the cost of design flexibility in the context of the T-X acquisition 
scenario.   
Analysis 
The first step of analysis was to generate the proper data points and establish cost 
averages for each epoch.  Using the CER tool provided by AFLCMC/XZE, estimates of 
development, production, and O&S costs were recorded across the range of values 
established by the epoch variables.  The disposal cost was another output of the CER 
tool; however, disposal costs were less than a tenth of a percent of the total LCC for each 
epoch.  Therefore, disposal costs were omitted from this analysis.  Using H as an 
example, for 200 aircraft, four cost estimates were generated adding 100 lb increments to 
the AF baseline and four additional cost estimates were generated using a two engine 
design.  This process was repeated twice more at fleet sizes of 250 and 300 aircraft.  The 
average across all the H cost estimates was recorded with an assumed uniform 
distribution.  The averages of each epoch are summarized in Table 5: Epoch Cost 
Averages. 
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Table 5: Epoch Cost Averages 
Epoch LCC Total Dev 
Cost 
Unit 
Prod 
Cost 
Unit O&S 
Cost 
# of 
A/C 
AF $48,236 $2,916 $39.72 $89.76 350 
N $37,625 $2,949 $48.36 $90.02 250 
SO $30,592 $2,994 $48.86 $89.13 200 
H $37,033 $2,805 $46.71 $89.89 250 
NOTE: All $ figures BY13 in millions 
 
These averages were based upon inputs in the CER tool that estimated 
development beginning in 2016, production beginning in 2020, and aircraft retirement in 
2047.  The total estimated program timeline from development to retirement was 32 
years.  This notional timeline was based upon the baseline AF estimate provided by 
AFLCMC/XZE. 
Based upon the generation of this data, several observations were made.  
Development cost was independent of fleet size.  Regardless of how many aircraft were 
input into the CER tool, development costs would hold constant.  As indicated in SO’s 
unit production cost average, avionics weight played a larger factor in production due to a 
high unit production cost.  Likewise, SO’s unit O&S cost was slighter lower than the 
larger fleet epochs due to avionics weight having very little impact on O&S which 
overcame the diseconomies of scale associated with a smaller fleet size.  This was 
compared to N and H where additional aircraft weight had a lesser impact on production 
cost than avionics weight, but a slightly larger negative impact to unit O&S cost 
compared to the AF baseline.   
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As discussed in Chapter 3, cost estimates for each epoch were generated by 
adding or changing requirements to the AF baseline.  Average development cost for H 
was lower than the AF development cost.  Although initially odd, closer examination 
revealed that while all other inputs were held constant in the CER tool, switching from a 
one engine design to a two engine design would decrease development costs by 
approximately $300 million.  According to the CER tool, the one and two engine designs 
are modifications to existing engines.  A possible explanation for the reduced 
development costs for a two engine design could be due to an existing two engine design 
that is closer to the modified engine requirements than the one engine design.  Because 
the range of additional weight for H was relatively small (100 lbs – 400 lbs), the cost to 
develop the additional weight did not exceed the decreased development cost when 
averaged across all possible H cost estimates.  A two engine design was not without its 
own penalties.  Although development costs associated with a two engine design would 
decrease development cost, an increase in the production cost was incurred.   
Before calculating expected LCCs, key terms were defined.  Flexible investment 
cost was the cost to design flexibility into the AF baseline design and was determined by 
the design strategy chosen by the decision-maker.    Flexible investment cost impacted 
the baseline development, production, and O&S costs, and was incurred regardless of 
whether the option to implement the additional capabilities was exercised.  The flexible 
investment development cost was equal to the AF baseline development cost plus the 
additional development cost to accommodate a given era’s requirements.  The exception 
to this was AFH where the development cost was set equal to AF rather than using a 
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development cost lower than the baseline.  The two epoch era equations listed used Navy 
requirements as an example in Equation 1. 
AFN	Flexible	Investment	Development	Cost ൌ AFN	Dev	Cost  ( 1 ) 
 
The total of AF unit production cost plus the product of N unit production cost 
and N subjective impact was multiplied by the number of AF aircraft to calculate the 
AFN flexible investment production cost.  The subjective impact captured the additional 
cost associated with producing AF aircraft with design flexibility that could 
accommodate a potential future N requirement is demonstrated in Equation 2.  
AFN	Flexible	Investment	Production	Cost ൌ
#	of	AF	A/C	*	ሺሺAF	unit	Prod	Costሻ ൅
ሺN	unit	Prod	Cost ∗ 	N	subjective	impactሻሻ ( 2 ) 
 
Figure 4: Flexible Investment Production Cost, illustrates Equation 2 where the 
baseline unit production cost was more expensive when considering the design flexibility 
required of the potential future requirement of N.  The unit production cost impact due to 
flexible design was a small percentage of the unit production cost of N. 
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Figure 4: Flexible Investment Production Cost 
 
The subjective impact was a notional value between 0 – 1.0 that represented how 
design flexibility negatively affected the cost of producing each AF aircraft.  A value of 
zero indicated no impact to AF production costs.  The purpose of the subjective impact 
was to model the penalty of design flexibility on the baseline AF system.  The subjective 
impact captured the design change to AF that allowed the aircraft to be easily modified to 
accommodate future epoch requirements if the need arose.   
Notional subjective impact values are listed in Table 6: Subjective Impacts.  The 
Navy epoch was considered to have the greatest cost impact to unit production costs due 
to the nature of accommodating a reinforced landing gear and a tail hook.  This could 
result in a heavier frame compared to the AF baseline which would translate into 
increased production and O&S costs.  The special operations epoch was considered to 
have a moderate negative impact due to the considerations of improved avionics.  
Although a stronger frame than the AF baseline may not be necessary, the space 
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necessary to accommodate larger avionics could have a moderate impact on the baseline 
design.  Finally, the Heavy epoch was considered to have the least negative impact as 
supporting a separate control scheme within the cockpit might require relatively minimal 
changes between the interfaces of the cockpit and airframe. 
Table 6: Subjective Impacts 
Epoch Subjective Impact 
N 0.10 
SO 0.07 
H 0.05 
 
Flexible investment O&S cost was treated in the same manner as flexible 
investment production cost.  The AF baseline O&S cost incurred a penalty for the 
additional flexibility requirements that must be accommodated throughout the life cycle 
of the now modified AF system as shown in Equation 3. 
AFN	Flexible	Investment	O&S	Cost	 ൌ #	of	AF	A/C	*	ሺሺAF	unit	O&S	Costሻ	 ൅
	ሺN	unit	O&S	Cost	 ∗ 	N	subjective	impactሻሻ  ( 3 ) 
 
The flexible investment cost of the extended eras AFNH and AFNSOH followed 
the same convention as their shorter counterparts with a small exception to AFNSOH’s 
flexible investment production cost as demonstrated in Equations 4 - 5.  The flexible 
investment development cost of AFNSOH aggregated the development cost delta of the 
additional epochs.  As previously mentioned, the negative cost delta between AF and H 
development cost was ignored. 
AFNSOH	Flexible	Investment	Development	Cost ൌ AFN	Dev	Cost	 ൅
ሺAFSO	Dev	Cost	‐	AF	Dev	Costሻ ( 4 ) 
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AFNSOH	Flexible	Investment	Production	Cost	ൌ	#	of	AF	A/C ∗
ሺሺAF	unit	Prod	Costሻ ൅ ሺN	unit	Prod	Cost ∗ N	subjective	impactሻ ൅ 0.9 ∗
ሾሺSO	unit	Prod	Cost ∗ SO	subjective	impactሻ ൅ ሺH	unit	Prod	Cost ∗
H	subjective	impactሻሿሻ ( 5 ) 
 
The two epoch eras have assumed an additive nature of accommodating the 
flexible design of additional requirements.  The general convention for flexible 
investment costs for AFNSOH was modified by the inclusion of multiplying 0.9 to the 
sum of the flexible design impact of SO and H.  This was designed to capture some of the 
non-additive properties of producing flexible design changes to roughly the same area of 
the AF aircraft. It can be argued that production efficiencies could exist when modifying 
AF’s baseline avionics as demanded by SO’s requirements and cockpit interchangeability 
as demanded by H’s requirements.  A relatively high value of 0.9 was chosen to capture a 
minor efficiency because the avionics in an A/C are not necessarily limited to the general 
proximity of the cockpit.  The further the distance flexible design work occurs away from 
the cockpit, the less production efficiencies would be realized between SO and H 
requirements.  The non-additive attribute exists only in the AFNSOH and AFSOH 
flexible investment production cost and is unique to these two eras.   
AFNSOH	Flexible	Investment	O&S	Cost	ൌ	#	of	AF	A/C ∗ ሺሺAF	unit	O&S	Costሻ ൅
ሺN	unit	O&S	Cost ∗ N	subjective	impactሻ ൅ ሺSO	unit	O&S	Cost ∗
SO	subjective	impactሻ ൅ ሺH	unit	O&S	Cost ∗ H	subjective	impactሻሻ ( 6 ) 
 
The AFNH era arguably did not realize the same production efficiencies as 
AFNSOH and AFSOH due to the separate areas of the AF aircraft being modified as 
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demanded by N and H requirements.  Therefore, both AFNH flexible investment 
production and O&S costs followed similar convention to the shorter eras as shown in 
Equations 7 - 8. 
AFNH	Flexible	Investment	Production	Cost	ൌ	#	of	AF	A/C ∗
ሺሺAF	unit	Prod	Costሻ ൅ ሺN	unit	Prod	Cost ∗ N	subjective	impactሻ ൅
ሺH	unit	Prod	Cost ∗ H	subjective	impactሻሻ ( 7 ) 
 
AFNH	Flexible	Investment	O&S	Cost	ൌ	#	of	AF	A/C ∗ ሺሺAF	unit	O&S	Costሻ ൅
ሺN	unit	O&S	Cost ∗ N	subjective	impactሻ ൅ ሺH	unit	O&S	Cost ∗
H	subjective	impactሻሻ ( 8 ) 
 
The AFNSO era followed the same convention as AFNH to calculate flexible 
investment cost.  Eras with three or four epochs suffered greater penalties.  For example, 
the AFNH era required that all AF aircraft accommodate design flexibility for N and H 
requirements while the AFN era required the accommodation of only N requirements.  A 
summary of the flexible investment LCC of the six design strategies is listed in Table 7: 
Flexible Investment Summary. 
Table 7: Flexible Investment Summary 
Design Strategy Era Flexible Investment 
LCC 
Delta 
AF AF $48,236 $0 
AFN AF $53,113 $4,877 
AFSO AF $51,695 $3,459 
AFH AF $50,627 $2,391 
AFNH AF $55,533 $7,297 
AFNSOH AF $58,787 $10,551 
NOTE: All $ figures BY13 in millions 
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Implementation cost was the cost of an era if a given era occurred.  There were a 
few key assumptions to implementation cost which were driven by the limitations in the 
CER tool.  If an era was realized, it was assumed that the additional aircraft produced 
occurred concurrently with AF production.  For example, in one realization of an era, the 
option to exercise an era may happen years after the AF baseline has finished production.  
For the purposes of this study, an era is exercised immediately and both the AF aircraft 
with design flexibility and the epoch specific aircraft (e.g. AFN) with implemented 
capabilities began production at the same time and shared identical service life and 
retirement dates (see Figure 2: Era Timeline Assumption and Figure 3: Possible Era 
Realization).  If this were not the case, cost penalties associated with discordant epoch 
timelines within the era would be required. 
Implementation development cost was equal to flexible investment development 
cost.  The Implementation production and O&S cost, and ultimately LCC, were 
dependent on the chosen design strategy.  In Figure 5: AF Design Strategy, given an AF 
design strategy, or the decision to forgo any sort of design flexibility, implementation 
cost was equal to the sum of the separate epoch LCCs.  All dollar figures are in BY13 in 
millions. 
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Figure 5: AF Design Strategy 
 
Equation 9 shows the implementation LCC of AFN given an AF design strategy 
is:  
AF	→	AFN	Implementation	LCC ൌ AF	LCC	൅	N	LCC ( 9 ) 
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 Figure 6: AFN Design Strategy summarizes the implementation LCC of each era 
given an AFN design strategy. 
 
 
Figure 6: AFN Design Strategy 
 The implementation LCC of each era included the AFN flexible investment cost.  
The flexible investment cost captured the cost penalty to the AF aircraft for 
accommodating design flexibility.  To demonstrate in Equation 10, the implementation 
LCC for AFH given an AFN design strategy (AFN  AFH denotes an AFN design 
strategy and an AFH era realization) is: 
AFN	→	AFH	Implementation	LCC ൌ AFN	Flex	Inv	LCC ൅ H	LCC ( 10 ) 
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AFN  AFN was an aligned scenario where flexibility was designed for and the 
need to capitalize on the flexible design occurred.  Implementation LCC for this was 
divided into development, production, and O&S cost shown in Equations 11 - 13: 
AFN → AFN	Implementation	Dev	Cost ൌ AFN	Dev	Cost ( 11 ) 
 
AFN	→	AFN	Implementation	Prod	Cost ൌ 1 ∗ ሺAFN	Flex	Inv	Prod	Cost ൅
ሺ#	of	N	A/C ∗ N	unit	Prod	Costሻሻ ( 12 ) 
 
AFN	→	AFN	Implementation	O&S	Cost	ൌ	0.96 ∗ ሺAFN	Flex	Inv	O&S	Cost ൅
ሺ#	of	N	A/C ∗ N	unit	O&S	Costሻሻ ( 13 ) 
 
 These equations captured the 350 AF aircraft with N requirement design 
flexibility and the cost to produce and operate the additional 250 N aircraft at their 
respective costs.  In equations 12 and 13, a modifier was applied to the total production 
and O&S cost.  This modifier represented economies of scale based on the production 
and sustainment of a larger fleet of aircraft.  The modifier was calculated by averaging 
the percent increase or decrease in unit production and O&S cost across the four epochs 
when the number of aircraft was increased from the baseline 350 aircraft to the epoch’s 
respective additional aircraft averages.  The purpose of this modifier was to realize any 
efficiencies or inefficiencies associated with a larger fleet of aircraft as estimated by the 
CER tool.   A summary of all the production cost modifiers are represented in Table 8: 
Summary of Production Cost Modifiers. 
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Table 8: Summary of Production Cost Modifiers 
Era # of A/C Production Cost Modifier 
AF 350 1.00 
AFSO 500 1.17 
AFN, AFH 600 1.20 
AFNSO, AFSOH 700 1.24 
AFNH 850 1.37 
AFNSOH 950 1.41 
 
 A summary of all the O&S cost modifiers are represented in Table 9: Summary of 
O&S Cost Modifiers. 
Table 9: Summary of O&S Cost Modifiers 
Era # of A/C O&S Cost Modifier 
AF 350 1 
AFSO 500 0.98 
AFN, AFH 600 0.97 
AFNSO, AFSOH 700 0.94 
AFNH 850 0.89 
AFNSOH 950 0.85 
 
 Counter-intuitively, unit production cost increased as the number of aircraft 
produced increased.  To investigate this, the annual rate aircraft production rate was set at 
48 aircraft.  As fleet size increased and annual aircraft production rate stayed equal, a 
longer production run would increase unit production cost.  Higher annual production 
rates associated with larger fleet sizes decreased unit production cost; however, without 
any additional information on annual production rates, the default value remained.  The 
production cost modifier was set to a value of one to avoid diseconomies of scale in the 
unit production cost for larger fleet sizes. 
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Figure 7: AFNSOH Branch Summary summarizes the Implementation LCC given 
an AFNSOH design strategy. 
 
 
Figure 7: AFNSOH Branch Summary 
 
 Like the smaller design strategies, all the eras within the AFNSOH design 
strategy included AFNSOH flexible investment cost to capture the AF aircraft 
accommodating flexible design requirements for N, SO, and H.  Because this design 
strategy accommodates all potential requirements, any additional epochs realized will 
also incur the subjective impact penalty associated with flexible design.  For example, 
given AFNSOH  AFNH, all the AF aircraft suffer penalties for accommodating N, SO, 
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and H flexibility, all the N aircraft suffer penalties for accommodating SO and H 
flexibility, and all the H aircraft suffer penalties for accommodating N and H flexibility.  
In addition to the subjective impact penalties, the production and O&S costs were 
modified by the appropriate values from Table 8: Summary of Production Cost 
Modifiers, and Table 9: Summary of O&S Cost Modifiers. 
 Table 10: Design Strategy and Era Realization Summary, summarizes all LCCs of 
the six design strategies and eight possible eras. 
Table 10: Design Strategy and Era Realization Summary 
 Design Strategy 
Era AF AFN AFSO AFH AFNH AFNSOH 
AF $48,236 $53,113 $51,695 $50,627 $55,533 $58,787 
AFN $85,861 $85,460 $89,320 $88,252 $89,482 $95,003 
AFSO $78,828 $83,705 $77,772 $81,219 $92,565 $88,777 
AFH $85,269 $90,145 $88,728 $82,482 $90,746 $96,267 
AFNSO $116,453 $116,052 $115,397 $118,844 $120,074 $123,795 
AFNH $122,894 $122,493 $126,353 $120,107 $118,553 $127,458 
AFSOH $115,861 $120,737 $114,804 $113,074 $121,338 $125,031 
AFNSOH $153,486 $153,085 $152,429 $150,699 $149,145 $152,723 
NOTE: All $ figures BY13 in millions 
  
For each design strategy where the era occurred (e.g. AFNAFN, AFNH 
AFNH, etc.), the lowest LCC was realized compared to the other possible LCCs 
associated with that design strategy.  The AFNSOH design strategy was the exception to 
this pattern.  This suggests that diminishing returns is associated with design flexibility.  
As the number of cost penalties due to a flexible design increased and afflicted a larger 
fleet of aircraft, the diminishing returns increased until, the AFNSOH’s case, it incurred 
negative value to design for flexibility. 
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The values in Table 10: Design Strategy and Era Realization Summary, were 
populated in a decision tree using Palisade’s Precision Tree add-in as well as the 
probabilities of occurrences listed in Table 3: Era Summary.  Based upon this baseline 
information, Precision Tree recommended that choosing an AF design strategy would net 
the lowest expected LCC.  The differences in design strategy expected LCC were 
compared to the AF design strategy and are summarized in Table 11: Expected LCC 
Differences. 
Table 11: Expected LCC Differences 
 Design Strategy 
Design 
Strategy 
AF AFN AFSO AFH AFNH AFNSOH 
AF $0 $2,027 $1,833 $579 $4,781 $8,597 
NOTE: All $ figures BY13 in millions 
 
A positive value for any of the design strategies other than AF indicates higher 
expected LCC associated with design flexibility.  These results state that given the 
assumptions and input values made in this study, design flexibility provides no expected 
return on investment.  Figure 8: Design Flexibility Model Visualization, illustrates one of 
the major reasons the expected LCC differences suggested a design strategy against 
design flexibility given the baseline values assumed in this study.  The AFN era was used 
as an example. 
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Figure 8: Design Flexibility Model Visualization 
 
 The top row in Figure 8: Design Flexibility Model Visualization, illustrates the 
LCC to procure a separate AF and Navy system which is compared to the bottom row 
which depicts the LCC of the AFN era.  The AFN implementation equation captured the 
cost savings in development indicated by the striped box.  However, for production cost 
there were two factors that drove the AFN production cost to be greater than the sum of 
the AF and N production costs. 
1. Subjective Impact – This value applied a cost penalty on the AF aircraft that 
now had to be produced and operated with design flexibility considerations. 
2. Production Cost Modifier – Due to the diseconomy of scale indicated by the 
CER tool, a value of one was assumed and there were no economies of scale 
associated with production cost. 
 
The same two factors that affected AFN production cost worked in a competing 
manner for AFN O&S cost.  The same subjective impact that was applied to AFN 
production cost was applied to AFN O&S cost.  However, according to the default inputs 
in the CER tool, the larger aircraft fleets realized cost savings, effectively reducing the 
O&S cost modifier to a value of less than one.  In this case, the O&S cost savings 
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associated with the O&S cost modifier outweighed the cost penalty of the subjective 
impact resulting in an the AFN O&S cost to be less than the sum of the O&S costs of a 
separate AF and N systems. 
Several sensitivity analyses were completed to challenge the assumptions made in 
this study and provided further insight into if positive value exists in design flexibility for 
this trainer aircraft. 
Sensitivity Analysis 
 Sensitivity analyses allowed a few of the major assumptions and parameters to be 
examined. 
1. N, SO, and H epochs fully encompassed AF requirements 
2. Probability of era occurrence 
3. Subjective Impact 
4. Production and O&S Cost Modifiers 
 
The first assumption was necessary due to the limited nature of information.  
Subject matter experts at AFLCMC/XZE were available to provide many of the inputs 
into the CER tool to develop the AF cost estimate; however, the same could not be said 
for N, SO, and H cost estimates.  In the absence of specific requirements and detailed 
inputs to the CER tool, N, SO, and H requirements were treated as additions to AF 
requirements.  This meant that N, SO, and H requirements fully encompassed AF 
requirements.  This assumption had a profound impact on the results of the study which 
suggested design flexibility yielded negative value.  Arguably, N requirements could be 
very similar to AF requirements.  However, SO and H requirements could be less 
demanding than AF requirements in terms of cost to design and implement due to lower 
performance requirements.  A one-way sensitivity analysis was conducted via Precision 
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Tree to observe how decreasing the LCC of AFH’s implementation cost would impact 
the recommended decision.  The range of values captured was a 10% increase from the 
baseline value of $82,482M and a 25% decrease.  The strategy region is shown in Figure 
9: AFH Implementation Cost . 
 
 
Figure 9: AFH Implementation Cost One-Way Strategy Region 
  
At LCC values of ~$81,000M, a 1.6% decrease in the baseline AFH 
Implementation Cost, the expected value of choosing an AFH design strategy over the 
AF design strategy became more beneficial.  This result suggested that with cost 
84000
86000
88000
90000
92000
94000
96000
98000
100000
102000
$6
0,
00
0 
$6
5,
00
0 
$7
0,
00
0 
$7
5,
00
0 
$8
0,
00
0 
$8
5,
00
0 
$9
0,
00
0 
$9
5,
00
0 
Ex
pe
ct
ed
 Va
lu
e
AFH Implemenation Cost (B48)
Strategy Region of Decision Tree 'Expected LCC'
Expected Value of Node 'Design Strategy' (D22)
With Variation of AFH Implemenation Cost (B48) 
AF
AFN
AFSO
AFH
AFNH
AFNSOH
48 
estimates of N, SO, and H that do not encompass AF requirements, it is easily foreseeable 
that a flexible design option would result in LCC savings.  Another one-way analysis was 
similarly implemented by changing AFNSOH implementation cost.  The strategy region 
is shown in Figure 10: AFNSOH Implementation Cost . 
 
 
Figure 10: AFNSOH Implementation Cost One-Way Strategy Region 
  
Despite a 25% decrease to the baseline AFNSOH Implementation Cost, the 
strategy region indicates that pursuing an AFNSOH design strategy is of poor value.  The 
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25% decrease to the baseline value has very little impact to the expected value of the 
decision tree.   
 Another subjective parameter in this study was the distribution of probabilities 
among the eras.  A one-way sensitivity analysis on any one of the probabilities could be 
completed; however, as there are eight outcomes that are collectively exhaustive, 
changing the probability of one outcome should affect the probability of the remainder of 
outcomes.  The outcome probabilities in Precision Tree must be collectively exhaustive 
in order for a sensitivity analysis to be conducted.  In order to meet this constraint, the 
chance probabilities were automatically normalized via the model setting option in 
Precision Tree.  The first sensitivity analysis was conducted by observing how a change 
in the probability of AFN affected expected LCC.  The sensitivity graph is shown in 
Figure 11: Normalized AFN Probability One-Way Sensitivity Graph, and the strategy 
region is show in Figure 12: Normalized AFN Probability One-Way Strategy Region. 
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Figure 11: Normalized AFN Probability One-Way Sensitivity Graph
 
Figure 12: Normalized AFN Probability One-Way Strategy Region 
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The sensitivity graph states that the expected value of the decision tree decreases 
as the probability of AFN increases.  The strategy region recommends the AF design 
strategy for lower probabilities of AFN and recommends an AFH design strategy and 
eventually an AFN design strategy as the normalized probability for AFN continue to 
increase.  This result is likely driven by the first major assumption observed, the fact that 
N, SO, and H fully encompass AF requirements.   
A two-way analysis was conducted to explore the tradespace of changing the 
probability of AFN and the production cost modifier which was held at a constant value 
of one during the baseline analysis to avoid diseconomies of scale.  The strategy region 
for the two-way analysis is shown in Figure 13: Production Cost Modifier & Normalized 
Probability Two-Way Strategy Region. 
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Figure 13: Production Cost Modifier & Normalized Probability Two-Way Strategy 
Region 
 
As AFN probability increased and the production cost modifier decreased, it 
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graph shown in Figure 14: Production Cost Modifier & Normalized Probability Two-
Way Sensitivity Graph. 
 
 
Figure 14: Production Cost Modifier & Normalized Probability Two-Way 
Sensitivity Graph 
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Due to the normalization of probabilities across the eight outcomes, the 
probabilities shown on the x-axis in Figures 11 - 14 were the raw values of the sensitivity 
analysis.  Table 12: Raw vs Normalized Probabilities  shows the normalized values of 
probability for a better understanding of how the actual probability of AFN occurring 
affected expected LCC. 
Table 12: Raw vs Normalized Probabilities 
AFN Probabilities (30% baseline) 
Raw Value Normalized Value 
10% 12.50% 
20% 22.22% 
30% 30.00% 
40% 36.36% 
50% 41.67% 
60% 46.15% 
70% 50.00% 
80% 53.33% 
90% 56.25% 
 
In the sensitivity analysis, Precision Tree incremented the AFN probability by a 
specified value, normalized all the probabilities within that design strategy, and output 
the result.  As the probability of occurrence increased, the expected LCC difference for 
each respective era approached negative values.  This indicated cost savings. According 
to both sensitivity analyses, a production cost modifier combined with a high probability 
of era occurrence would suggest LCC savings.   
The final parameter observed with sensitivity analysis was the subjective impact 
that design flexibility imparted on the AF baseline.  The strategy region is shown in 
Figure 15: N Subjective Impact One-Way Strategy Region. 
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Figure 15: N Subjective Impact One-Way Strategy Region 
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analysis is shown in Figure 16: N Subjective Impact & AFN Implementation Cost Two-
Way Strategy Region. 
 
 
Figure 16: N Subjective Impact & AFN Implementation Cost Two-Way Strategy 
Region 
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 When both the N subjective impact and AFN Implementation Cost were varied, a 
~5.5% decrease in the baseline AFN Implementation Cost triggered the strategy region 
for this analysis to recommend an AFN design strategy over the AF design strategy.  As 
Implementation Cost further decreased, subjective impact was given the freedom to adopt 
a higher value. 
Results 
 The analysis suggests that designing for flexibility can be more cost effective than 
developing two separate systems.  However, based upon this method, the value of design 
flexibility is largely dependent on the likelihood that an era will occur, the subjective 
impact the design will have on the production and O&S costs of the baseline design, and 
economies of scale associated with larger fleet sizes.  Given the baseline parameters, the 
AFN era is the only scenario where the expected LCC differences of an AF baseline with 
design flexibility would be favorable over two separate airframes.  The output value of 
the study is of less important than the methodology demonstrated.  Beyond the expected 
LCC differences calculated, a methodology was demonstrated to quantitatively measure 
the value of design flexibility. 
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V.  Conclusions and Recommendations 
Chapter Overview 
This chapter summarizes the research completed in this study, revisits the 
investigative questions, and provides recommendations for future action and research. 
Conclusions of Research 
This research concluded that a methodology could be developed that 
quantitatively measured design flexibility and the expected impact to LCC based upon 
era realization.  The quantitative measurement was accomplished by using LCC as a 
proxy metric.  Realistically, value consists of many factors including LCC.  Making a 
decision based off LCC alone would be foolish if certain design strategies failed to meet 
the key performance parameters of the baseline system.   
Probability of occurrence, the subjective impact of design flexibility, and cost 
modifiers associated with economies of scale were large drivers of expected LCC.  If this 
method were implemented again, these factors should be well understood in the context 
of the relevant study. 
Given the assumptions of the study, this method has demonstrated that when 
expected LCC is used as a value of design flexibility, a quantifiable return on investment 
can be measured.  
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Investigative Questions Answered 
1. How can design flexibility, as a proxy measure for design flexibility, be 
quantifiably measured in the early stages of development of a system? 
 
The method developed in this study was driven by the limitations of the provided 
CER tool.  Expected LCC has been demonstrated as a proxy measurement for design 
flexibility in previous work and the results of this analysis support that claim [Ryan, 
Jacques and Colombi 2013]. 
2. Can we measure the impact to expected LCC stemming from design changes 
to accommodate flexibility given uncertain future requirements? 
 
There a numerous factors that can affect the impact to expected LCC when 
measuring design flexibility.  The assumptions made in this study were to aid in the 
absence of detailed information and to help scope the many possibilities in which new 
requirements could be levied on a system.  Following the general methodology listed in 
Table 13: General Methodology to estimate Impact to Expected LCC, it was possible to 
estimate the impact to expected LCC stemming from design changes to accommodate 
flexibility given uncertain future requirements.
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Table 13: General Methodology to estimate Impact to Expected LCC 
Step Cross-Reference 
Establish appropriate epoch variables using 
available cost estimation method 
Table 4: Epoch Variables 
Assign range of values to epoch variables 
to capture uncertainty and model LCC Table 5: Epoch Cost Averages 
Assign probability of occurrence associated 
with each era Table 3: Era Summary 
Establish design strategy and era 
tradespace 
Figure 5: AF Design Strategy 
Figure 6: AFN Design Strategy 
Calculate expected LCC of each design 
strategy 
Table 10: Design Strategy and Era 
Realization Summary 
Note optimal design strategy N/A 
Conduct sensitivity analysis on 
assumptions and observe changes to 
optimal design strategy 
Figure 14: Production Cost Modifier & 
Normalized Probability Two-Way 
Sensitivity Graph 
 
The methodology used in this study is only relevant given the timeline 
assumptions outlined in Figure 2: Era Timeline Assumption.  
3. Can a general method be developed that can be applied to other domains 
beyond airframes? 
 
With similar resources, the methodology in Table 13: General Methodology to 
estimate Impact to Expected LCC, could arguably be applied to other domains.  
Depending on the information available, similar assumptions would have to be 
established.  A CER tool specific for the applied domain will be required to substitute the 
aircraft CER tool used in this study.  
Significance of Research 
The ability to measure design flexibility can potentially save the DOD a 
considerable amount of money over the course of a system’s life cycle.  With a general 
method to capture the expected LCC differences by choosing a system with design 
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flexibility versus procuring two separate systems, decision-makers will have a better idea 
of the value of pursuing a flexible design option.   
Recommendations for Action 
To improve the accuracy of the result of this study, gathering unique requirements 
for the epochs would be necessary instead of assuming they fully encompassed AF 
requirements.  LCC was the only measure of value in this study.  Realistically, if design 
flexibility negatively affected an epoch’s aircraft on a large enough scale, key 
performance parameters could be at risk.  Future work could identify certain performance 
characteristics and their associated penalties due to the separate epoch variables.  Once 
established, breakpoints in the design flexibility implemented can be identified where, 
despite LCC savings, key performance parameters would no longer be met.  At this point 
it would no longer be in the best interest of the decision-maker to pursue a given design 
strategy. 
A uniform distribution was assumed when the average cost of an epoch was 
calculated across a range of aircraft weight and avionics weight.  A distribution based off 
actual or parametric data would help improve the output of this method. 
The cost modifiers associated with economies of scale were calculated by 
observing changes to cost as modeled by the CER tool.  Further research could be done 
by examining existing literature on economies of scale and applying real world values to 
this method which would further improve the outputs of the study. 
Another area of subjectivity to be addressed is the subjective impacts associated 
with each era’s requirements.  Like the cost modifiers, further research into how 
62 
parameters such as aircraft weight impacts production and O&S cost would greatly 
improve the estimates of this study. 
Recommendations for Future Research 
Taking the methodology proposed in this study and directly applying it to a 
different domain using an appropriate CER tool would be valuable to see if similar results 
could be replicated.  Research that replicates this methodology across multiple domains 
would lend greater credence to the methodology proposed in this paper. 
Developing a specific CER tool that has accommodations for quantifying design 
flexibility is another area of future research.  Currently, the methodology takes a CER 
tool that inherently does not account for design flexibility, makes several assumptions, 
and outputs expected LCC differences.  If a CER tool could be created that accounts for 
the assumptions of this study such as concurrent production, equal service life, equal 
disposal times, and same base year dollars, the estimate for design flexibility has the 
potential to be much more accurate. 
Summary 
Given the baseline values for era probability of occurrences, subjective impacts, 
and cost modifiers, the expected LCC differences were not as substantial as originally 
anticipated.  Sensitivity analyses revealed how varying the subjective parameters 
impacted expected LCC differences.  Although this research could not point out specific 
break points due to the notional nature of many of the inputs, it has identified certain 
regions where design flexibility may no longer be of value to decision makers.  
Ultimately, this study’s goal is to take another small step towards the DOD valuable 
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resources on future acquisitions when the opportunity exists to design flexibility into a 
baseline system. 
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The purpose of this research was to demonstrate a methodology using an Epoch-Era Analysis to quantify and estimate the value of 
design flexibility early in the Department of Defense’s (DOD) acquisition life cycle.  This method was implemented using a 
possible replacement to the Air Force’s fighter-trainer aircraft as a baseline and a set of future requirements that would change the 
baseline.  An existing Cost Estimating Relationship tool was utilized in conjunction with a decision tree modeling approach to 
accommodate uncertain future needs.  Sensitivity analysis was performed to identify model parameters with dominant effects on the 
recommended design strategies.  The results indicated that this methodology can quantitatively measure design flexibility using 
existing tools when key assumptions are made.  The methodology exists as a proof of concept within the domain of aircraft to 
quantitatively measure design flexibility early in the acquisition life cycle.  Further research is required to characterize the 
assumptions of this study and to test this methodology in other domains to validate its broader applicability.  
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